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ABSTRACT
This thesis is on the "Politics of Independence" in Nigeria.
On October 1, I960, Nigeria gained independence as a federation
with three main regions:

Northern, Western and Eastern.

Unruffled

by the complicating factors of political disturbances or a white
settler minority like Kenya, the change from the British to
independent Nigeria was smooth.

Two years after independence,

however, the first major crisis broke out in the Western Region
which consequently precipitated further crises until the federation
reached a breaking point in January 1966.

In that month Nigeria's

government led by Balewa was toppled by a military coup.
The thesis attempts to show that the smooth transfer of power
notwithstanding, the difficulties that beset Nigeria after
independence had their roots in British colonial policies from
the British decision on amalgamation in 1914 to the constitutional
problems of the 1950's.

The thesis shows this by historically

reviewing the impact of the early British policies and by analyzing
the effects of the several constitutions introduced in the 1950's.
Specifically this study attempts to answer the following
questions:
mistake?

Was the original amalgamation of the two Nigerias a
How were the regions in Nigeria formed?

Was the

creation of three regions in Nigeria an arbitrary creation for
the interest of the British?

Was federation an optimal solution
vii

for the Nigerian problems?

Were the British responsible for the

crises that beset an independent Nigeria.
The thesis concludes that the British policies regarding the
questions vitally affecting Nigeria before and after independence
were inadequate and that the major problems in Nigeria were the
direct result of British policies and rule.

Rather than establish

two countries as the cultures dictated, the British chose to force
an amalgamation which is still the root of Nigeria's difficulties.

viii

INTRODUCTION
Nigeria is the largest and most diverse populated country in
tropical Africa.

It shows more clearly the complexities involved

in political development than any country.

Varied pre-colonial

political models existed with little or no interrelation:

tribes:

petty kingdoms, chiefdoms, state kingdoms and most of all, the
greatest empire to emerge in Black Africa, the Fulani Empire.
On the whole, Nigeria went into independence on October 1, I960
as a federation with three main regions:

the Northern, Western,

and Eastern regions, unruffled by the complicating factors of
political disturbances or a white settler minority like Kenya.
The transition from British to independent Nigeria was smooth.
The regions had their own government with Premier, elected House
of Assembly and House of Chiefs.

Representatives were sent from

each region to the Federal House of Representatives and Senate.
In each of these regions in the Federation there existed
three dominant ethnic groups.

In the Northern Region, the dominant

group was the Hausaswit'n the Tiv and Igala antagonistic to the
Housas.

In the Western Region the dominant group was the Yoruba,

with the Binis and Ika-Ibo antagonistic to the Yoruba who today
form the Mid-West Region.

In the Eastern Region, the dominant

group was the Ibo with two antagonistic groups,
Efilc.

the Ibibio and

The situation became complicated due to the fact that the

1
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North was larger and more populated than two of the Southern
regions combined.

As a result, this gave the Northern Region a

comfortable position of power over the rest of the regions.
Furthermore, as the British authority passed to Nigerians, it became
obvious to the minority groups in the federation that they had no
share in the national cake of the country in matters concerning
education, health, because they were placed in the hands of the
dominant ethnic groups.
separatist movements.

As a result, there xvas dissatisfaction and
This resulted in the political legacy of the

colonial masters, a federal structure, being tested to the breaking
point during the years after independence.
This study focuses on the Politics of Nigeria from 1960 through
1970 and especially notes:
1)

that the amalgamation of two Nigerias was a mistake.

2)

that Whitehall endorsed Lord Lugard's recommendation without

regard for the natives.
3)

that the constitution Nigeria inherited from the British

government precipitated an imbalance in the Nigeria Federation.
4)

that there is sufficient evidence to show that the federal

structure of Nigeria can be considered an arbitrary decision of the
colonical policy.
5)

that by 1960, federalism with three dominant ethnic groups

was not an optimal solution because it did not solve the problems
of the minority groups in Nigeria.
Furthermore, this study seeks to answer the following questions:
How were the three regions, Northern, Western, and Eastern Regions
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formed?

Was the creation of the three regions an arbitrary creation

for the interest of the British?
Deliberate attention is paid to detail in an attempt to present
the true picture and the problems that confronted the Nigerian
politicians in the years after independence.

The primary source of

this study come from the Nigerian newspapers, government publications,
books written by African scholars and pamphlets.
This study will endeavor to describe what happened and why it
happened rather than constructing paradigms which have no validity
to Nigerian experience.

An overall theoretical statement about

Nigeria that may be created will meet with objections and contra
dictions.

The reason is that any attempt to construct a framework

of analysis is so general that it will not reveal the complexities
and hetereogeneity of the Nigerian society.
The reader is forewarned that the 10 years covered in this
study is not an adequate yard stick on which to base general
conclusions about the naivete of the British.

Yet, a period of 10

years with the series of crises and political bargaining between the
North and the South is enough to say that the major problems in
Nigeria have grown out of British rule.

CHAPTER 1

Geography
Nigeria is situated at the Eastern end of the Gulf of Guinea,
between the fourth and fourteenth parallels north of the equator.
Its area is 356,699 square miles.^

It is slightly greater than the

combined areas of France and Germany.

2

The longest distance from

the east to west is over 700 miles, and from north to south about
650 miles.

Nigeria derives its name from the River Niger which flows

730 miles inside the country.

The tributary of the Niger is Benue

which flows eastward.
There are three zones of vegetation:

the swamp forest which

lies in the coastal belt, the equatorial rain forest in the southern
part, and the savanna grassland which occupies the vast region of the
North and the Middle Belt.
There are also two major seasons.

A wet or rainy season

beginning in April and ending in October.
country during the wet season.
green grass.

Heavy rainfalls pelt the

These turn the savanna into tall,

They also turn the forest region dense in the south.

^Nigeria: One Hundred Facts about Nigeria. (Lagos:
Ministry of Information Division, 1966), p. 1.

2

Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 3.
^Qnc Hundred Facts about Nigeria, p. 1.
4
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Rainfall varies between 100-140 inches in the south.
starts in November and lasts up to March.

The dry season

The temperature ranges

from 70-80 degrees F. in the morning, and in the afternoon it ranges
from 90-100 degrees F.

It seldom gets above 90 degrees on the coast

because of the cool winds which blow from the Lagoon and the
Atlantic.

The lowest temperature is recorded in the dry season;

this is the time of the year when dusty, north-eastern winds from
the Sahara blow across the Northern Region thereby influencing the
South.

This is known as the Harmathan.

Population
Nigeria is the most populous and one of the largest African
countries.

According to the census at the end of 1973 its population

was 80 million.^

Nigeria has more people than all the West African

States south of Sahara, containing approximately 16 per cent of
Africa's and 22 per cent of Tropical Africa's population.^

By these

figures, she can claim to be the most populous African country.
There is great variation in the population density from about
70 per square mile in the North, to 150 per square mile in the West,
to 260 per square mile in the East.
Nigeria is an agrarian country, with vast areas of arable land
on which almost all tropical crops can grow.

The farmers raise local4
5

4

"Three Potential Black Giants," Bulletin of the Africa Institute
and South Africa, 1974:407.
5
Alan Sokolski, The Establishment of Manufacturing in Nigeria,
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 7.
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crops for domestic consumption and a number of export crops, for
example:

palm oil, groundnuts, cotton, cassava, maize and bananas.

In the North, the Fulanis raise cattle for local consumption, and
the hides and skins are exported.

Concerning food production, one

can say that Nigeria is self sufficient.

Regions of Nigeria Before 1967
When the Federation of Nigeria became an independent nation on
October 1, 1960, Nigeria was made up of three political regions-Northern, Eastern, and Western.

Three years later, the Mid-Western

Region was carved out of the Western Region subsequent to a
referendum held in the Mid-West.

The Mid-Western Region was split

from the Western Region in order to break up the Action Group (AG)
party which enjoyed considerable support in the West and also to
satisfy the regional sentiments of the Edo- and Ibo-speaking people
who wanted to be free from the Yoruba domination.

In 1967, the

country was further divided into twelve states by General Yakubu
Gowon's military government.

This study however, is limited to the

description of the four regions of Nigeria that existed before 1967.
The Northern Region
The Northern Region makes up more than three quarters of the
area of Nigeria and possesses about half the country's population.
It is the awakening giant of Nigeria.

It is bounded on the north

by the River Niger and Chad, on the WTest by Dahomey, on the east
by the Cameroons and on the south by the Rivers Niger and Benue.
The most important cities in the North are:

Kano city, for centuries

7
a commercial center of the caravan trade; Kaduna, the capital of the
North and a European creation where Lord Lugard had wanted to locate
the capital of Nigeria; Zaria, the center of education; Jos, the
mining center; and Gusau, one of the cotton towns of the Northern
Nigeria.

Presently, the Hausaland supplies Nigeria's exports of

groundnuts, tin, hides and skin.
Spreading over large area of Northern Nigeria, especially
around Sokoto, Kano, Zaria, and Bauchi, are Hausa-speaking people
who are negroid in origin.

Richard Sklar, quoting M. G. Smith,

defines the Hausa to mean 'the entire Moslem, Hausa-speaking
population.'^

Sklar also distinguishes the two principal subdivisions

of the Hausas :

the indigenous Habe and the settled Fulani who have

intermarried.*
7

Each of the remaining major groups of the Northern

Region is identified with a particular territorial subdivision, such
as:

the Kanuri of Bornu, Province, the Nupe of the southern Niger

and eastern Ilorin, the Tiv of Benue Province, and the Yoruba of
southern Ilorin and western Kabba.

(See Map) No. 1.

The Habe

introduced Islam into Hausaland in the fourteenth century, and as
a result a form of government and judicial system based on Islamic
doctrines developed.

In Hausaland, each state was ruled by an Emir

(King), and each state was independent within a loose confederation.
The emirate rule is theocratic, which involves the fusion of
political and religious authority.

The West is primarily

£
Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 6.
7Ibid.

8
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agricultural and accounts for Nigeria's supplies of cocoa, rubber,
and timber.
The Western Region is inhabited by the Yorubas who comprise
g

over 20 per cent of the population of Nigeria.

Yoruba legend

attributes the origin of people to Oduduwa, a diety who is believed
to have reigned at Ife where Oduduwa created both black and white
people of the world.

There is no doubt that Ife was the first

settlement of the Yorubas.
Anthropologists record that the political system of the Yoruba
is the lineage system which Richard Sklar defines as "an exoganeous
9
descent group whose members venerate founding ancestors.
lineage head is known as "Olori Ebi."

The

He was the oldest male who

presided over his lineage compound meetings held in his own compound.
Disrespect to an elder was punishable by fine of palm wine or kola
nuts to be consumed at the meetings.

Superior office holders were

chosen from the lineage of elders, and the appointments were
confirmed by the Oba (King).
kingmakers.

An Oba was chosen by chiefs or

In Yorubaland, Obas did not exert authoritarian rule

on their subjects as did the Emirs.

There were checks and balances,

regulated by custom and institutions of the state.

In recent years,

the power of the Obas has changed since power now rests in the hands
of Nigerian elites.

Their functions have become ceremonial.

8
R. Olufemi Ekundare, An Economic History of Nigeria 1860-1960,
(New York; Africans Publishing Co., 1973), p. 8.
q

Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 10.
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The Eastern Region
This is Nigeria's second smallest region and it has the
greatest population density.

The Eastern Region is bounded by the

River Benue on the north, the Atlantic on the south, River Niger on
the west and the Cameroons on the east.

The principal cities are:

Enugu, the regional capital and the center of administration;
Nsulcka, a university town; Onitsha, a commercial center; Aba,
Owerri, Umuhia, Calabar and Port Harcourt are sea ports.
exports of the East are:

The major

palm oil, palm kernel, oil and rubber.

Inhabiting the Eastern Region are some 12.4 million people^®
with various languages, dialects and culture.
in Eastern Region is the Igbo-speakers.

The largest language

Barry Floyd's studies show

that over 60 per cent of the population, who occupy over half of
the area of this region, consists of the Ibo.^
The non-Ibo speaking people inhabit the eastern sectors and
the Delta.

The largest groups are the Ibibio and the Annang.

are Efik-speaking people.

They

Others are the Ogoja, who also inhabit

the eastern territory; and the Ijaws, inhabiting the Delta. Among
the Ogojas, language changes from village to village.
The system of government in Iboland is entrusted in the hands
of the village chief.

The chief may preside over village meetings

and the settling of disputes, but his function never extends over
the chairperson of village meetings.

In some parts of Iboland

11
Barry Floyd, Eastern Nigeria,(New York; Frederick A. Praeger,
Publishers, 1.969), p. 19.
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chieftancy is unknown, tribal government is a collective rule of
elders.

It is a kind of town meeting.

The Mid-We.st Region
This is the smallest and the newest region.

Its eastern border

is bounded by the River Niger and the west by the Western Region.
In the north it is bounded by the River Niger and in the south by
the Atlantic.

The principal towns are:

Benin, an anciet city ruled

by Oba of Benin, and the regional capital; Sapele, Warri, Farcados
are seaports; Asaba, the center of the Mid-Western Ibos; Aboh, Kwale,
Agbor, and Ugheli.

Mid-West principal exports are oil, rubber, palm

nuts, palm oil, cocoa and timber.
The population of the Mid-West is 2.5 million.

Of this, the

major tribe is the Bini or Edo-speaking, and the minority groups
are Urohobos, Isokos, Ijaws and the Itshekiris.

The Edos are

believed to be an off-shoot of the Yoruba nation, while the Ibos
of the Mid-West are off-shoot of the Ibos of the East.
Western Ibos may be subdivided into two groups:

The Mid-

the Asaba Ibos and

Ukwanis whose dilects slightly differ from each other.

Another

ethnic groups is the Ijaws, who occupy the Delta province.

They

have their counterparts in the Eastern Region.
The system of government in the Mid-West is the age grade
system.

It provided elders to settle disputes and to punish

offenders.

Each of the towns has a government responsible for the

external relations including declaration of war and fixing times
for harvest.

CHAPTER 2

Historical Background
Nigeria, which became an independent nation on October 1, 1960,
was ruled by the British for over sixty years.

Through the pre-

colonial period Nigeria was never united, and during the sixty years
of colonialism and independent years the basic disunity was merely
hidden.
However, it was only the fight for independence from the British
government that gave Nigerians a sense of unity and nationhood.
This idea of nationhood was short lived.

In 1960, Nigeria's federal

structure was unable to enforce authority, because the three regions
thought in tribal rather than national terms.

One should not have

been surprised at the threats of secession which beset Nigeria in
the 1960's because it had often been there; they resulted from her
devisive past.
Thus, in 1953, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba leader of the
Action Group AG, threatened secession of the West from the
federation.

In 1965, Sir Ahmadu Bello (the Sarduana of Sokoto),

former Northern Premier, made a similar threat for the North.

But,

it was the East, under Colonel Odumergwu Ojukwu which succeeded in
pulling out of the federation of Nigeria.

On May 30, 1967, Colonel

Ojukwu proclaimed Eastern Nigeria as the Republic of Biafra.

12
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Before the secession of Eastern Nigeria, the Federation of
Nigeria was neither happy nor harmonious.

Frederick Forsyth aptly

described the situation of Nigeria when he said:

"It had for five

previous years stumbled from crisis to crisis, and already came to
the verge of disintegration."^
The fundamental cause had been rooted in tribal hostility
which was further aggravated by the artificial regional boundaries
created in this enormous nation.

The other cause was that Nigeria

was an "amalgam of peoples welded together in the interest and for
the benefit of European powers."

2

The first Europeans to come to Nigeria were the Portuguese.
Their aim was to buy slaves from the natives who served as middlemen
and to ship them to the New World at an exorbitant profit.

The

Portuguese were followed by French, Dutch, Swedes, Germans, Spaniards,
and the British.

It was the British who colonized Nigeria.

For a long period European contact with Nigeria was confined to
the coastal areas.

The chiefs and their peoples prevented the

infiltration of Europeans because it would interfere with their
trading interests as middlemen between the people of the interior
and the European traders.

With the abolition of slavery in 1807,

the penetration into the interior of Nigeria began.

The British

penetration into the hinterland was not a peaceful one.

They had to

■^Arthur Agwucha Nwnankwo, and Samuel Udochukwu Ifejika, Biafra:
The Making of a Nation,CNew York : Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 11.
o

John Hatch, Nigeria: The Seeds of Disaster, (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company, 197Q), p. 137.

14

resort to force as the acquisition of Lagos through "gun-boat
diplomacy" aptly illustrates.

According to Sir William Geary, the

British policy at that time under Palmerson was to suppress the
slave trade by diplomacy or, if need be by force.

3

As a result,

when the King of Lagos, Oba Kosoko, refused to sign a treaty with
England, Lagos was bombarded by British warships and Akintoye, a
puppet on the throne of Lagos was installed as Oba of Lagos.
After the British had taken over Lagos a British pioneer, Sir
Goldie organized British merchants who were along the coast to form
the Royal Niger Company against their rival, the French.
years, Sir Goldie waged a two-front struggle:

For five

on one hand against

the French traders whom he had finally bought under pressure, and
on the other hand against apathy in Whitehall.

4

Sir Goldie worked

hard to persuade the Liberal British government, under Gladstone,
to declare the area of the Oil Rivers and Lower Nigeria a British
Colony.

Gladstone rejected Goldie's suggestion.

According to

John Hatch:
....the fact is that for most of the nineteenth
century the British, supreme in world economic power,
were deeply influenced by anti-colonial doctrines.
Conventional economists, under the sway of Adam Smith,
had discarded their earlier mercantiliat theories and
came to conclusion that possession of colonies under
mine the nation's economic health.
3

Sir William Nevil M. Geary, Nigeria Under British Rule, London,
Methuen and Co., 1927, p. 25.
4
Frederick Forsyth, The Biafra Story, (Baltimore, Mass:
Penguin Books, 1969).
^John Hatch, Nigeria:

The Seeds of Disaster, (Chicago:

Henry Regnery Company, 1970), p. 137.
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The argument was that colonies were too expensive to
administrate and a waste to British taxpayers.

By 1884, however,

the mood in Britain as well as continental Europe changed.

The

German Chancellor Bismarck, called the famous Berlin Conference in
1885 in order to partition West Africa among the rival countries.
According to Katherine Savage, "European diplomats gathered around
a conference table and carved Africa like a birthday cake, handing
pieces to the land-hungry nations."^

The Berlin Conference left

Britain in command of the Niger Basin as a British protectorate.

In

order to extend British influence in Nigeria, the British government
gave the Royal Niger Company power to administer, make treaties,
levy customs and trade in all territories of the coast of Niger and
its affluents.

But as the nineteenth century was coming to an end,

the Royal Niger Company became impetent in regards to the governing
of the interior of Nigeria because of the conflicts between the
natives and incompetent company officers.^
This precipitated the British government to take control in
January 1900.

Having taken Lagos the British began to push to the

North.
The greatest challenge to the British penetration of Northern
Nigeria came from the Emirs.

They feared the intrusion of white

men whom the Emirs labelled "white pagan."

The Emirs initially

^Katherine Savage, The Story of Africa: South of Sahara,
(New York: Henry Z. Walck, Incorporated, 1961), p. 70.
^A.A. Nwafor Orizu, Without Bitterness.(New York; Creative Age
Press Inc., 1944), p. 132.
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refused Lord Frederick Lugard of Britain entry to their territory,
but he was persistent and ultimately used force in a manner
similar to that employed by his British predecessors.

Thus, an

imperial force organized by Lord Lugard invaded and conquered
Northern Nigeria.

The Emirs who had opposed his penetration were

replaced by weaker rulers who acquiesced to British policy.
After the British conquered the North, the two Nigerias---the
North and South— -politically and administratively developed
separately for several years, until 1912 when Lord Lugard returned
to Nigeria as Governor General to arrange the amalgamation of 1914.
Reasons for Amalgamation
What was the reason behind the amalgamation of the two
Nigerias in 1914 when the British knew that the North was entirely
different from the South?
Documentation and scholarly analysis show that the unification
of Nigeria was in the economic interests of Britain.

On this point

Michael Growther stated:
The immediate reason for the decision...was economic
expediency. The Northern Protectorate was running
by subsidy from the Southern Protectorate, and an
Imperial Grant-in-Aid from Britain of about $300,000
a year. This conflicted with old aged colonial
policy that each territory should be self-subsidising...
It was felt that the prosperous Southern Protectorate
could sudsidize its Northern neighbour until, there was
pressing need to coordinate railway policy, which at
that time was practically non-existent.^

g

Michael Growther, A Short Story of Nigeria,(New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1963), p. 213.
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Arthur Nwnakwo and Samuel Ifejika in assessing British aim in
Nigeria have stated that:
Britain's overriding interest in Nigeria was
economic, and step to amalgamate was aimed as
assuring profits and better exploitation of
local resources.^
Hatch also made a valid point when he said:

"Beneath the

surface of administrative and political policies there always lay

10

strong undercurrent of economic influence.

It was this economic

influence that Britain used in amalgamating Nigeria without regard
for the natives.

Under this economic myopia, Britain neglected the

complexity of Nigerian society.

The separate units were joined to

save the British treasury the expense of developing the two
Nigerias as separate countries.
Before the actual amalgamation took place in January 1914,
the area that is recognized as Nigeria today was under several
administrations.

There was the Government of Oil Rivers Protectorate

which was later renamed the Niger Coast Protectorate with the
British Consul who resided at Lagos as the administrator; there was
the Colony of Lagos which was initially under the Governor of the
West African Settlement residing at Sierra-Leone, and following
the amalgamation of the Old Colony of Lagos with Gold Coast its
headquarters were located at Accra (which was separated in 1806);
there were the Niger Territories of the Royal Niger Company which
administered the Coast from Burutu to Akassa under the Royal Niger

^Biafra:
^ Nigeria:

The Making of a Nation, p . 32.
Seeds of Disaster, p. 203.

18
charter; and finally, there was the Northern Protectorate with
customs post at Idah.

The Protectorate of Northern Nigeria had its

civil service and Resident Commissioners who administered the
North.^

In 1905 the Old Lagos Colony was amalgamated with the Old

Rivers Protectorate and became known as Southern Nigeria.

The move

toward bigger amalgamation of the North and South had taken its
first step.

Nigeria was constructed from two enormous units,

different in all respects.
Geographically, the area of the North is larger than the South.
Most part of the North is an open Savanna grassland dotted with boab
trees and little rainfall.

Ethnographically, the North was known to

be populated by Moslems, whereas in the South, the people were
Animists before the arrival of the missionaries.
It can be argued, therefore, that geographically and religiously
the North is different from the South.

Unless one grasps this, it

will be impossible to understand the course of modern history of
Nigeria and the reasons why the unification of the two Nigerias
were unpopular.
The Unpopularity of Nigerian Unification
The amalgamation met with strong resistance from Lagos elites
and editors.

The analysis of the Nigerian press reveals the

unpopularity of Lugard's amalgamation.

It also gives some detail of

assessing the opinion of Nigerian elites towards the unification of

^A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Lugard and Amalgamation of Nigeria, (London:
Frank and Cass and Company Ltd., 196$, p. 3.

19

Nigeria.
The veil was lifted as early as 1913 when the Lagos Standard
raised doubt that "the amalgamation is looked upon with much interest,
not unmixed with some anxiety by the inhabitants of Lagos."

12

The

editor's disillusionment as regards the unification was based on
two reasons:

first, the amalgamation of Lagos with Sirra Leone and

then with the Gold Coast placed Lagos subservient to those governors;
and second, the amalgamation of the Old Rivers Protectorate with
the Colony of Lagos brought many changes such as the large influx
of aliens from Calabar, Warri and Opobo where great numbers
aggrevated the unemployment problem in the over populated capital of
Lagos.13
t

Still in doubt of Nigeria the Lagos Standard, under the heading
"What will be our future Be?"

wrote that even the dead are not

free from the tax of Lagos which the amalgamation introduced.

14

As Lagosians were digesting the doubts and disillusionment of
the amalgamation, the Nigerian Chronicle on the morning of January
23, 1914, came up with a series of articles on the Provincial
Courts Bill which was due to be implemented on March 1, 1914.

In

support, it printed a letter written by J.G. Campbell under the
heading:

"Does the English Man Practice Fair Play and Justice in

Nigeria."'*'^

12

Campbell charged Lugard's administration of injustices

Lagos Standard, September 3, 1913.

13
Lagos Standard, September 3, 1913.
^\,agos Standard. September 3, 1913;
1 t:
-^Nigerian Chronicle, January 30, 1914.
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meted out against the natives, furthermore, he described the
unification of "distribution of amalgamation pudding" in which "a
big share of the whole show with promotion and high salaries to
matchwent

to the white officials.

The Provincial Courts caused

the Lagos elites to call a mass meeting of Lagosians at the Clover
Hall in protest against the bill, and to elect a delegation to
present to the Governor a petition as to how the inhabitants of
Lagos felt over the threat of the bill.
The shot that the Nigerian Chronicle fired was continued by the
Lagos Standard.

It attacked the evils of placing the courts in

charge of the District Commissioners.^

Times of Nigeria joined its

sister papers in attacking Sir Frederick Lugard.
editorial said:

The Times in an

"It is very surprising that the authorities deem it

rightful to introduce such a system merely, according to Sir Edwin
Speed, to maintain the prestige of a few political officers to the
1 ft
detriment of the whole community.'0
While the passions grew high on the judicial bill the Nigerian
Chronicle diverted its attack to the speech Lord Lugard made at the
24th Annual Exhibition of School Work held on April 1914.

Under

the heading "The Education Question in Nigeria" the newspaper said
the policy gave initiative to professional education at King's

■^Nigerian Chronicle, January 30, 1914.
^ Lagos Standard, "Fear of Amalgamation," September 10, 1913.
^ The Times of Nigeria, March 24, 1914, p. 4.
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College only, and that the Education Ordinance "is to limit higher
education to the Sons of a few gentlemen at King's College.^
A year after the amalgamation, the Lagos Standard tried to
revive the issue of judicial changes in Nigeria by saying that
"for more than a year attention had been drawn to the changes in
administration of justice in Nigeria...instead of applying it to the
United Nigeria, the Northern Nigeria system has been adopted,
involving the practical abolition of the Supreme Court and creation
of Provincial Courts presided over by Executive officials before which
on
Counsel is not allowed to appear."
Other points were raised on the issue of taxation without
representatives in the government.
as tyrannical.

The Lagos Standard described it

In a letter written by Partriach Campbell he accused

Lugard's administration of "military d i c t a t o r s h i p . T h e campaign
to discredit the amalgamation was stepped up in the Lagos Newspapers
and followed by an anti-Northern campaign in the South.

The Lagos

community believed that the Provincial Court Ordinance which
empowered flogging or whipping was the old Northern law presented to
a unified Nigeria as new legislation.

The attacks launched by the

press and the frequent mass rallies by Lagosians forced the government
to announce the postponement of its controversial Provincial Courts
Bill.
19

The Nigerian Chronicle, July 24, 1914, p. 21.
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Lagos Standard, January 27, 1915.
Lagos Standard. August 11, 1915
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In an editorial the Lagos Standard summed up the amalgamation
as follows:

It "seemed to destroy our hitherto cherished hopes."

22

Compiling what the press of Nigeria said about amalgamation in
1914 is a useful guide in interpreting the present situation in
Nigeria.

It is important for the reader to note the unpopularity of

unification of the two Nigerias and how the South opposed it.
The rejection of the unification of two Nigerias reached its
climax in 1953, when the North and South confronted themselves in
the Lagos constitutional conference.

During the conference Sarduana

of Sokoto made a now famous speech in which he declared:
mistake of 1914 has come to light."

23

"The

It was at this stage that

observers and Nigerian scholars realized the implication of the
amalgamation of the North and South.
Criticisms of 1914 Unification
The amalgamation was an act of folly in the history of Nigeria,
especially when one judges the way that Lugard carried out his
unification.

It is a known fact that many nations started as "geo~

graphical expression" in which many groups with different cultural
backgrounds have been able to achieve national unity.
that comes to mind is that of the United States.

The country

Today after a

constitutional crisis, it is one of the most powerful and united
nations on earth.

But that of Nigeria was a different story.

Why

were Nigerian experiences different?

22

Lagos Standard, December 30, 1914.
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Sir Ahmadu Bello, My Life, (London: Cambridge University Press,
1962), p. 133.
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Coleman points out that there are two principal ways to
facilitate unity:
1) "The creation of internal peace and
maintenance of law and order and;
2) the imposition of a common government
which all recognized and to which all give
obedience, allegiance and loyalty.
The two qualities mentioned by Coleman were wanting in Lugard's
unification.

The unity that the British government made was the

pacification of the country.

The pacification was more beneficial

to the British than to the natives because it allowed profits to
flow into the coffers of the British treasury.

The colonial policies

succeeded in the division of Nigeria instead of unifying the people.
For example:

Nigeria was divided into three separate colonial

territories, each territory independently administered by three
different administrators who were directly responsible to the British
government; furthermore, instead of making the South and North interact
which would have fulfilled the aim of the amalgamation, they were
deliberately kept apart.

It was not until 1947 under the Richard

Constitution that the North joined their counterparts for the first
time in a legislative process.

25

The legislative Council in Lagos, which could have also served
as a unifying body for governing the whole of Nigeria, was made
impotent by Lord Lugard.

It met only once a year and this was the

24
James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism,
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), p. 45.
9S

T.O.S. Benson, "Our Constitution Needs Change," Daily Times,
August 13, 1964, p. 3.
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only occasion administrators could meet to discuss problems in
common; as a result, hurried decisions were often taken.

The next

step taken by Lugard was to propose the establishment of a Nigerian
Council whose power was not to legislate but to serve as a kind of
advisory board.
progress.

It was incompatible with the advancing state of

In short, it was retrogressive.

26

Lagos which had started the introduction of British forms of
law was separated from the South, and to add insult upon an injury
Lugard proposed a judicial bill which empowered flogging or whipping
and also trial without counsel in court.

This seemed like a kind of

military court which showed the military mentality of Lugard.
One could argue that what Nigeria inherited after the amalgamation
was a separatist movement, oppression from the British and intro
duction of Mohammedan laws to the South.
Writing fifty six years (1970) later, Hatch made these striking
remarks about the unsatisfactory results of indirect rule and
amalgamation:
On almost every point, it is clear, the system of
indirect rule and the form of amalgamation based on
separation that accompanies it were unsatisfactory,
and their application lit a set of fuses that could
end in a series of explosions that would detonate not
only the accumulation of resentment against rule but
growing suspicious, frustrations and antagonisms of
African community.27

^ The Nigerian Times, November 2, 1915, p. 4.

27

Nigeria:

Seeds of Disaster, p. 194.
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For Hatch the growing suspicions and antagonisms which bedevilled
Nigeria were due to the unification policy and the system of indirect
rule.

They became evident after independence because Lugard's

unification was a continuous separation of the North and South.

Ian

Nicholson evaluating the balance sheet of the 1914 amalgamation,
summed up Lugard's administration as:
Trampling on all carefully nursed seedlings of
civilized government, law and legislature and
substituting authoritarian administocracy in
which the whole emphasis was away from the coast,
away from law education in any sense, away from the
city and from consideration of the market place.^
According to Nicholson, Lugard's administration was a closed system.
Naivete of the British
There were many differences within Nigerian socities, and
these differences have always been deep.

Therefore, for the British

to assume that they could amalgamate Nigeria under one policy revealed
lack of insight in the realities of Nigerian problem.

British

naivete was demonstrated when the colonial office agreed to follow
Lugard's plan.

This episode demonstrated that Whitehall had no vision

of the future for the people.
It is important to remember Lugard's policy of "indirect rule"
and its evil consequence.

The system of ruling the people of the

Northern Region through the Emirs needs some analysis.

It not only

entrenched a feudalistic type of government on the North, but it
precipitated riots in the East.

The reason for this was that in Ibo-

land, the system of indirect rule was alien because the Ibo-system
OO

°Ian Nicholson, "The Machinery of the Federal and Regional
Government" in John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics,
(Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 154-155.
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was a kind of village meeting in which the Council of Ministers,
which is the real law maker, is guided by customs and taboos.
Members of the Council of Ministers are elders who are allocated
different jobs.

One age-grade may see to the building of a road,

another to a market.

Under this arrangement there was no defined

autocratic chief as in the North.

We should also keep in mind that

when indirect rule was introduced in the East, the warrant chiefs that
were chosen by the British became despotic and results in riots and
blood-shed.

29

In Yorubaland the indirect-rule did not work because the Yoruba
Obas were not autocratic as the Northern Emirs.

All decisions of the

Obas required the approvals of their chiefs.
29

Ntieyong U. Akpan, Epitaph to Indirect Rule,(London:
Cassell and Company Limited, 1956), p. 34.

CHAPTER

3

Nigerian Constitution from 1950-60
This chapter focuses on an attempt to draw the Nigerian
Constitution which evolved between 1950-60.

Before considering the

Nigerian Constitution, however, it is important to say a few words
about the political development of that country between 1914-40's.
Between World War I and the end of World War II, Nigeria remained
a collection of separate communities merely held together by British
rule.

Nevertheless, there were some underlying changes.

For example,

the colonial government introduced form of Legislative Council of
which 12 of the 42 members were Nigerians.

The function of the

legislative body was advisory and it met infrequently.*In 1945, the Governor, Sir Arthur Richard, introduced a new con
stitution without the consultation of the Nigerian representatives.
This constitution gave Nigeria a unitary system in which administration
was divided between the three regions of Nigeria, each with its own
legislative house with the direction of policy remaining in Lagos.
In the summer of the year that it was introduced, the Richard
Constitution ran into trouble because the economic resentment it
provoked.

During the war, prices of food and standard of living had

sky-rocketed and many Nigerians had become wage earners.

To many

educated Nigerians it was intolerable that every high post in

^Nigeria:

The Seeds of Disaster, p. 147.
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government went to the Europeans.

This precipitated a miners strike

in the East which led to 21 miners being killed.

The horror of the
2

killings caused riots in Aba, Calabar, Onitsha and Port Harcourt.
Under mounting pressure from Nigerian nationalists, the Richard
Constitution was replaced.

My 1949, Sir Richard was replaced by

Sir John Macpherson who called for a new constitution to be drafted
in 1951.
Macpherson Constitution
The Macpherson constitutional conference convened at Ibadan
to decide whether Nigeria should become a federal state.

In fact, the

whole debate was based on "whether regionalism and federation might
3
aggravate centrifugal and communal tendencies."

The conference

agreed on a federal system with a bicameral legislature to be set up
in the North and West and a unicameral legislature in the East.

The

constitution atipulated that each region should send four ministers
to the federal legislature in Lagos.

According to Sklar, they were

not responsible to the legislature in the traditional sense, because
their appointments could be revoked only upon a two-thirds vote of
the regional assembly that delegated them to the federal legislature.^
The Macpherson constitution was the kind of constitution
that invites trouble.

For example, there was no provision for

2

3
4
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The Nigerian Political Parties, p. 188.
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pposition leaders in all the houses, and there was no provision for
eparate dissolution of a regional legislature.

One could argue that

his was a deviation from parliamentary democracy by the British
Dvernment which drafted the constitution.

This made the Macpherson

institution worthless.’’
The three major parties, the Northern People's Congress (NPC),
le Action Group (AG), and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens
ICNCN), each concentrated their efforts on a regional instead of
! itional basis.

The reason for this was that none of the political

] rties could attract votes outside their region.

Furthermore, each

: gion was dominated by one ethnic group, and consequently each party
1 came a regional party instead of a national party.

Even the central

i nisters who were appointed from each region to the center became
i gional delegates.

As a result, the strains of this constitution

i leashed such political upheaval in the East and West that the
I itish government was compelled to call the London

Constitutional

C nference in 1953 to bring an end to the Macpherson Constitution.
I idon Constitutional Conference
In 1953, another constitutional conference was called in London
b

the British government to resolve the strains embedded in the

1 >1 constitution.

James S. Coleman tells us that the following

f lr important points required resolution:
1)

that Nigeria would be a federal state with
limited and specific powers allocated to the
central government and leave others to the regions.

~*The Nigerian Political Parties, p. 188.
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2)

3)
4)

that each of the regional governments would be
controlled by Nigerian ministers having effective
authority over personal, affairs of their depart
ments, with a Nigerian "premier" as their head;
that full internal self-government would be
granted to those regions desiring it in 1956; and
that within three years (that is, not later than
August 31, 1956) another conference would be held
for the purpose of examining further questions on
self-government.^

Nigerian leaders disagreed on what the structure the federal system
should be.

Both the East and West agreed on a federal structure,

while the North proposed "a confederate plan in which no more than
customs, dues, and defense would be administered by the center."^
It should be recalled that the Macpherson Constitution had already
introduced a federal system, but the debate this time was on what
kind of system would be suitable for Nigeria.

After much heated

debate a federal structure was agreed upon by the great three major
political leaders, Azikiwe, Awolowo and Sarduana.
There was also rivalry between the East and West over the status
of Lagos.

The Eastern delegates proposed that Lagos should be a

federal territory.

Awolowo opposed the proposal and proposed that

Lagos should be incorporated into the Western Region.

He threatened

seccession if the conference failed to merge Lagos with the West.
After much bargaining the dispute over Lagos was settled in favor of
the Eastern Region's proposal.
On the question of self-government, the East and West agreed to
have self-government in 1956 and the North delayed their date until
£
Nigeria:
^ Nigeria:

Background to Nationalism, p. 371.
The Seeds of Disaster, p. 262.
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1959.
Nigerian Constitutional Conference 1957
The purpose of this conference was to decide on full regional
self-government.

Mr. Lennex Boyd, Secretary for Colonial Affairs

opened the conference by saying "The prosperity, good government,
and unity of Nigeria would be the object of any suggestions he might
0
put forth by way of proposal or counter proposal."
Before the Nigerian delegates left home for London where
the conference convened, the following agreement had been made
on issues to present before the British government:

1) regional

self-government; 2) independence by 1959; 3) interim changes in the
central government leading to complete transfer of power; and 4) a
constitution that would insure unity.

9

According to John Mackintosh there were only a few minor changes
in the proposals presented by Nigerian delegates.^

At the conference

Nigerian leaders agree that a bicameral parliament should be set up.
The senate was to consist of eight members from each region and the
House of Representatives was to consist of 320 members distributed
on basis of population.

It was also agreed that elections in the

two Southern regions were to be based on universal adult sulfrage.
0
Marguerite Cartwright, "About Nigerian Conference 1958,"
The Negro History Bulletin, 21 (May 1958):71.
9Ibid, p. 1 7 1 .
^ John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics,
(Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1966) p. 31.
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and in the North only on male suffrage.
The creation of more states was one of the important issues
raised at the conference.

The minority communities expressed their

fear as regards the domination of Nigeria by the three major tribes
after the British left.

The conference by-passed the issue and

Nigerian leaders reached an agreement with the British government
which stipulated that a Minorities Commission be appointed to investi
gate the fears alleged by the Minorities Community delegates.

When

the commission issued its reports it admitted that the fears expressed
by the minority groups were genuine and came out in favor of a strong
federal system and rejected the idea of creating more states.

In order

to satisfy the alleged fear expressed, the commission proposed that a
human rights bill be entrenched in the Independence Constitution and
provision be made to foster economic and social progress in the
minority areas
Independence Constitution
The Independence constitutional conference was called to endorse
a series of basic decisions which were taken from conferences of the
past decade.

At this conference, Nigerian leaders accepted the

Westminister model.
The basic features of the Independence Constitution as Mackintosh
tells us were:
That it was federal with residual powers falling
to the regions while both central and regional
governments operated a bicameral 'Westminister
model' type of parliamentary.

:

The Seeds of Disaster, p. 265.
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That is to say the features of the constitution— - ’Westminister
model' has the following factors:

1)

It permits a multi-party

system which makes an alternative government possible;

2) In a

Westminister model, ministers are to be collectively and individually
responsible to Parliament;

3) The Houses are to meet frequently to

discuss and answer questions;

4) Ministers must play an important

role in the administration of their ministries and in time of
question they must be able to furnish Parliament with the facts
concerning their ministries;
to prevent oppression; and

4) Elections are to be held frequently
5) In such a model opposition parties have

a fairly equal chance in winning an election.
The Independence Constitution also covered areas of fundamental
human rights, the electoral commission, legislative power and the
offices of Prime Minister and Governor General.

In case of a

constitutional dispute, the constitution stipulated that the Supreme
Court was to adjudicate.

12

The head of state in Nigeria was the Queen

whose representative was the Governor General.

Under the 1960

constitution, Nigeria asked for independence from the British
government.
Some of the Defects of Nigerian Constitution
Various modifications were made in the Nigerian constitution
from 1951-1961.

It was these modifications that evolved into

federalism as well as parliamentary government.

It was under the

constitution of 1947 that the East and West were granted self12

John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics,
(Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 29.
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government in 1957 and the North on March 15, 1959.

13

There were many defects in the Nigerian constitution.

For

instance, the Macpherson constitution was neither a unitary nor a
federal system.

Awolowo in his autobiography described it as a

wretched compromise between unitary and the federal system.
The defect was that the minister was not a political head of the
department under his portfolio.^

The British official who was to

advise the minister was made the head of the department and any
decisions taken by the minister were not binding on the head of the
department.

To those who are familiar with parliamentary government,

this type of structure lacked accountability.

It is undemocratic to

see a minister elected by his people who should be the head of his
government taking orders from a permanent secretary.

One may ask

where is the accountability which is one of the features of democracy.
In such an arrangement the permanent secretary could not be blamed
for any advice he offered, the minister, whereas he (the permanent
secretary) is in charge of the ministry.
The 1953 constitutional conference was called to resolve the
strains in the 1951 constitution.

The constitution ossified a federal

system without creating more state and to cater for the minorities.
The defect of the Westminister model as well as the federal system
was that it did not deserve the interests of the natives.
13

In short,

One Hundred Facts about Nigeria, p. 8.

^ Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Development in Nigeria, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 144.
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it was alien to Nigerian experience.

There are many variables which

pointed toward this direction as Bretton pointed out:
Historic setting, development pace, distribution
of wealth, value system, perspective commonly held,
population of mobility, degree of public partici
pation in power process, degree to which concensus
mechanism exist, availability of trained and skilled
administrators.... 15
Certainly, the variables mentioned above are the cornerstones of the
Westminister system but they were wanting in Nigeria.
Results of Nigerian Constitution
It is interesting to point out what the constitution handed over
by the British produced.

In the Northern Region, "Federalism has

made the Northern Region to retain Penal Code based on the Sudan
penal code."

16

Furthermore, it has made the North pursue a policy

of Northernization against all suggestions from the two Southern
regions.
Because of federalism, the British carved out chunks of
territory and assigned enormous power to the regions in the federation
of Nigeria.

As a result Nigerians duplicated agencies, for example,

the broadcasting system, especially, television.

Because of this

duplication, television owners at Enugu are not privileged to view
the programs at Ibadan or vice-versa.

This medium of communication

which could have served to facilitate in understanding Nigerian society
was sacrificed because of the concept of regionalism.

^Henry L. Bretton, Power and Stability in Nigeria, (ftew York:
F.A. Praeger, Publishers, 1962),p. 55.
16
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The British government also assigned enormous power to the
Nigerian Houses of Chiefs.

This entrenched tribalism because of the

chiefs over allegiance to the Obas or Emirs, whereas in Britain the
Queen is not a tribal head and the Lords owe little or no political
allegiance to the Queen.^ How can chiefs with legislative power
facilitate progress?

They werve no purpose of national unity; rather,

they are symbolic and perpetuate tribalism.

It is in understanding

the Nigerian constitution that one can understand the crisis that
follows.

^ Daily Express, Esker Toyo, "Case Against More States Weak,"
November 13, 1961, p. 4.

CHAPTER 4

Post Independence Crisis
When Britain granted independence to Nigeria nothing had basically
changed except that the multivarious societies of a large country had
become a single artificial political unit.

Independence to Nigerians

was hardly a momentous occasion, if judged from the effect on the
livers of the people.

It did no more than hand over complete

responsibility for dealing with issues involved in the constitution
to Nigerians:

the problems remained the same before and after

October 1, 1960.^

Consequently, it was not long before the latent

dissensions within the Nigerian political scene exploded.

Difficulties

first emerged in the West where the AG leader, Awolowo, and the
regional premier of the Western Region, Okintola, began to quarrel.
These were followed by arguments and disagreements over the removal
of Akintola from office by the Governor of the Western Region and
later when the decade drew to a close, disagreements over the
elections which were held in the West.
The Action Group Split
The quarrel between Awolowo and Akintola was due in part to the
strain Awolowo was under as leader of the opposition in Federal House.
The strain became unbearable to a politician as able as Awolowo, who

^Nigeria:

The Seeds of Disaster, p. 266.
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was a former premier of the West and used to issuing orders.

This

strain was aggravated when the man he appointed as the premier of the
West failed to consult him over major policies of the Western
government.

Finally, there were differences in political ideology

which widened the split in the AG.
These differences in ideology started in 1960.

On the eve of

Nigerian independence the AG declared its acceptance of a new political
ideology of "democratic socialism."

Having accepted this political

ideology, AG supporters expected that the government of the Western
Region, an organ of the AG which adopted this policy, would proceed
to translate the details of the new ideology into realities.
At the annual convention of the AG at Jos in the Northern Nigeria
all of these disagreements, latent or open, amerged.

Criticism was

centered on the fact that the party had disappointed its supporters
by encouraging the privileged class.

The radical elements charged

that on the issue of democratic socialism the leaders merely paid
lip service.

They contended that the party could not realize its

socialist goal when so much wealth and power was concentrated in
the hands of a few.

Akintola and his supporters argued that Awolowo

and his radical elements in 1960 had invited intellectuals outside
the party to dictate the AG policies by imposing a new ideology on
the party.
resentment.

This resulted in extreme criticism and fomented
2

Chief Enahoro then moved a motion of thanks for the presidential
address and started a blunt examination of Akintola's activities
2

Daily Express, May 15, 1962, p. 1.
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within the party.

He accused Akintola of being the strongest

detractor of the ideology of democratic socialism, and further
3

changed Akintola with planning to usurp the leadership of Awolowo.
Another reason for the quarrel was the question of whether the AG
would participate in a national government in Lagos headed by Balewa.
Akintola and his faction were in support of the AG joining Balewa's
national government.

They argued that such a coalition would help

the West in preventing the Federal Government from carving the MidWestern Region out of the West.

4

This sparked the latent intra-party

quarrels.
The AG crisis reached its climax when Akintola and Ayo Rosiji,
federal secretary of the AG, staged a walk-out and charged that
Awolowo had hired servants to campaign against them; they also
accused Awolowo of packing the convention with people who were not
entitled to be there.^
The question that confronted the convention and the party was:
What should be done to Akintola and his supporters?
at this stage moved into its second phase.

The crisis

At the AG federal executive^

meeting held in the West, Awolowo confronted Akintola and accused him
of..."mal-administration, anti-party activities, and gross
indiscipline."

The executive committee endorsed the party leader's

accusations and called for Akintola to resign as premier since the
party had lost confidence in him.

The premier refused to resign.

^Daily Express, "Enahoro indicts SLA," May 16, 1962, p. 1.
^West African Pilot, "Awo Side of the Story," March 3, 1962, p. 4.
^Nigerian Government and Politics, p. 446.
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The crisis then shifted from the intra-party caucus to the government
level.
The next move by Akintola was to advise the Governor of the Region
to dissolve the Western Houses of Legislature in view of the political
crisis in which the warring factions claimed a majority of the
electorate.

On the same day Akintola called on the Speaker to

summon the Western House to convene on May 23, 1962.

The Speaker

rejected the request and wrote to Akintola that he would call the
meeting of the House whenever he deemed it necessary.^
The Governor rejected the advice of Akintola, and exercised his
constitutional right by relieving Premier Akintola of office.

The

reason given was that the Premier no longer enjoyed the confidence of
his party on the strength of 66 members of the House who signed an
affidavit.

The Governor, Sir Adesoji Aderemi invoked Section 32 (a)

of the Western Nigeria Constitution which states:
The governor shall not remove the Premier from
office unless it appears to him that the Premier
no longer commands the support of the House of
Assembly.^
Akintola then filed a two-point motion in the High Court of
Western Region challenging the governor's right to dismiss him in
the absence of a resolution in the Western House demonstrating that
he no longer commanded the majority of the legislature.

While the

case was in court, the governor proceeded to exercise his power by
appointing Dauda Adegbenro as the new premier of the West effective

^ Daily Times, "Akintola 'Taku'," May 21, 1962.
^West African Pilot, May 21, 1962, p. 1.
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May 21, 1962.
The deposed Premier Akintola in another motion petitioned Balewa
to ask Her Majesty, Queen of England, to revoke the appointment of the
Governor of Western Region, in accordance with Section 1 subsection 2
of Chapter 1 of the constitution of Western Region which states:
There shall be a governor of the Region, who shall
be appointed by Her Majesty and shall hold office
during Her Majesty's pleasure and who shall be Her
Majesty's representative in the Region.
The Prime Minister shall consult the Prime
Minister of the Federation before tendering any.
advice to Her for the purpose of this section.8
The intra-party crisis in the AG which started in Jos became somewhat
preposterous when the governor dismissed the Premier and he in return
retaliated by calling on the Prime Minister to relieve the governor
of his office.

The party dispute and the constitutional crisis re

vealed the complexities of the Nigerian federal system, because the
constitution gave both the Governor and Premier the power to dismiss
each each from office.

Adding to the complexity was the fact that

the Premier had to petition the Queen in an independent Nigeria
before he could dismiss the governor of his region.

Not surprisingly,

the West African Pilot was to observe; when the British gave Nigeria
independence, they "insisted on a negotiated constitution only on
the terms favorable to their interest."^

In support, Azi Sayeb

summed up the British activities in these words.
O
Daily Times, "Akintola Deposed," May 22, 1962, p. 1.
Q
West African Pilot, "Time to Amend Constitution," March 27,
1963, p. 8.
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I do not take kindly to a people who hand out
independence to its former possession and envy
their sovereighty and employ all clandestine and
devilish instruments to run down the people....
And when their mechanizations are at work they sit
and emit scornful laughter and swear that if Britain
were still helm of affairs in Nigeria such would not
occur.10
Riot in the House
The AG crisis shifted to the Western House of Assembly where
a vote of confidence was to be taken in Adegbenro's new administration
It should be noted that in the meantime, Adegbenro was recognized as
the Premier from May 21, 1962 until May 25, 1962.
The West African Pilot reported what happened as Chief Odebiyi
stood up to move the motion of confidence in Adegbenro:
The mace symbol of authority was broken and Speaker,
Prince Adeleke Adedoyin narrowly escaped being
battered. He ducked when a member grabbed the mace
and swung it at him...
He had hardly started speaking when a member from
the government side jumped on the desk and raised a
war cry. In the ensuing confusion members threw
chairs at one another.
And immediately the place was turned into a ^
bedlam-chairs were broken and fences pulled down.
The attempt to settle the rivalry between Akintola and Adegbenro
ended in a fiasco.

The two warring factions of the AG contacted the

Prime Minister of the Federation Sir Abubakar on separate occasions
indicating that they would like to hold another meeting.

The Prime

Minister warned that he would like it to be known to the warring

^West African Pilot, "Break with Britain," April 2, 1963, p. 6.
West African Pilot, "Riot in West House, May 26, 1962, p. 1.
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factions that if they decided to hold a meeting, they could do so,
but he would not offer any police protection.

On this occasion, it

should be pointed out that the Prime Minister had instructed the
Western Region Commissioner of Police not to take orders from
Akintola and Adebgenro.

Agreement was reached to hold another

meeting which also ended in chaos.
It was clear from the two riots in the Western House that law
and

order had broken down in the West.

In order to cure the

madness that is the chaos, which beset the region, the Prime Minister
had to summon an emergency session of the Federal House to find ways
and means to curb the situation.
When the House met, a motion was tabled asking the Federal
government to declare the Western Region in a state of emergency and
to set up an administrator to prohibit public meetings and processions.

12

Awolowo protested that there was no state of public emergency in the
West.

He alleged that the NPC which was against democratic rule, and

had conspired with the NCNC to destroy the AG.

He argued that the
Jt

uproar in the Western House which led to a bill to declare an
emergency could be justified if there was wide spread violence in
the West.
However, the bill was passed by 232 votes to 44 in the House
of Representatives, and the Senate passed the same bill by a vote of
32 to seven. ^

12

West African Pilot, "State of Emergency in Western Nigeria,"
May 30, 1962, p. 1.
13

p. 1.

West African Pilot. "Big Arms Swoop," September 17, 1962,
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Emergency in the West
As soon as both Houses endorsed the bill, the Prime Minister
appointed Dr. M. Majekodunmi, a federal minister of Health, as the
administrator.

Immediately, the administrator issued restriction

orders to 26 persons which included Awolowo, Akintola, Adegbenro,
Rosiji and two members of the NCNC.
The Action Group challenged the validity of the Emergency Act,
by filing a court order in the Supreme Court.

The court dismissed

the case and noted that the Supreme Court could not question the
legality of a resolution passed by Parliament indicating that
Parliament has unlimited powers.
While the state of public emergency was imposed on Western
Nigeria a quantity of arms and ammunitions were discovered in
Awolowo's house at Ikenne and around Lagos in a "surprise swoop by
police.This

led to the famous Treason Trial.

It was alleged

that the AG leaders had imported a considerable quantity of arms
from Ghana to overthrow the government of Balewa.

In order to

carry out the coup successfully, the prosecution alleged that Awolowo
and his inner group--the Tactical Committee of the party, had sent
men to be trained for guerrilla warfare in Ghana.

The prosecution

further stated that D-Day was to be 2 a.m. on September 23, 1962.
The tactis were to plunge Lagos into total darkness, the Prime Minister
to be arrested without violence unless he resisted, and the British
officials--the GOC of the Army, Inspector General of police and

14W est African Pilot, "Plan to Capture Sir Abubakar," November
14, 1962 , p. 1.
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Commondore of the Navy-- were to be placed under house arrest.

Then,

Awolowo would make a broadcast to the nation as the new Prime
Minister.
This is not the place to comment on the conduct of the trial,
but it should be pointed out that the treason trial was controversial
from the beginning.

Two of the accused, Dr. Oladipo Maja and Richard

Babalola, who were charged along with Awolowo turned crown witnesses
and began to give the names^ of those who were involved in the
alleged coup.
The trial went on for nine months with confusing evidence
reaching the public through the Nigerian newspapers.

Awolowo and his

lieutenant, Chief Anthony Enahoro who had fled to Britain, were later
extradited to face trial in Nigeria and were convicted and sentenced
to imprisonment.
The General Strike 1964
The next crisis came from another source.

In 1963, the government

under pressure from workers appointed the Morgan Commission to look
into wages and working conditions.
The Commission recommended that the minimum wage per month be
increased by 38 pounds, but the federal government delayed in
publishing the salary increases as recommended by the Morgan Commission
which it appointed.

The government claimed that there was no money

to meet the salary increases.

This unwillingness by the government

to implement the Commission's recommendations resulted in the Joint-

1~>Daily Times,
p. 1.

November 14, 1962,
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Action Committee (JAC) led by veteran labor leader, Michael Imoudu,
organizing a strike which brought out almost eight hundred thousand
men.^

While the strike was initially over wages, it quickly

broadened into an attack on establishment for its corruption, its
tactless ostentation and its flagrant inefficiency.^
The government's attempt to paralyse the strike by issuing an
ultimatum which threatened mass dismissal only reinforced the attitude
of the workers and labor leaders.

After holding out for two weeks,

the workers won some salary increases, although the wage increases
were short of the recommendations of the Morgan Commission.
Giant strikes were rare in Nigerian politics.

The significance

was a new sense of unity that it brought within the trade union.
Unfortunately, this unity did not last due to the lack of an effective
leader to follow through on the momentum gained by the 1964 strike.
The schism in Nigerian politics caused by tribal differences also
undermined the unity forged by the strike.

Particularly damaging at

this time was the controversy over the new census.
Census Controversy
The one aspect to which the Northern and Southern politicians
were looking forward was the result of the new census.

The census

would play an important role in deciding who controlled Nigeria.
The last census in Nigeria was counted by the British in 1952-1953.

^ Daily Times, "Civil Servants in the Big Strike," June 6, 1964,
p. 1.
^ Daily Times, "Workers Anger," June 8, 1964, p. 1.
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Under the British, the population of Nigeria was thirty-one million,
and out of this figure the North had seventeen million people.

This

figure gave Northern Nigeria an absolute majority of the seats in
the Federal House.

So in 1962, Nigerian politicians agreed that the

1952 census was a mere estimate and that the Nigerian government
should prepare a census that would determine Nigeria's actual
population.

A British Officer, Mr. Warren, was appointed head of

the Census Board under the Ministry of Economic Development.
As Nigeria prepared for the census, Southern politicians toured
their constituencies urging people to be sure to be recognized in
the count.

Preliminary data gave the following tabulaties:
Northern Nigeria----------------Eastern Nigeria--------------- -r?
Western Nigeria-----------------Federal Territory---------------Total............................

18

21,335,700
12,508,325
10,436,045
660,432
44,940,502

When these figures were released a controversy arose.

The complaints

were based on the increases which were more than normal because they
exceeded by 25 per cent that which was expected to be normal in 10
years.

19

The census figures also established one fact that had

been feared by Southern politicians, that is, the North alone could
now form a government without votes from the South.

This made the

situation explosive.
The Federal House was called to debate the issue.

The Minister

of Economics, Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, a Northerner whose ministry was
18

West African Pilot, "Republic Before Another Census," March, 5,
1963, p. 6.
19

West African Pilot,

Fresh Census," December 1, 1963, p. 1.
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responsible for the census was critized on the floor of the House
and charged with inflating the Northern figures.

The NCNC members

in the House walked out in midst a tumult as the House members
shouted, "No, No, Now!!!" and "Warren Must Go."

20

In order to save the census, on which the Federal government had
spent 1.5 million pounds, it was recommended that verification checks
be made in certain areas.

The minister in charge flew to the three

Regions to explain the verification checks.
over the census deepened.

But the controversy

The tumult in the House and the demand of

the NCNC calling for the resignation of Mr. Warren were cases in
point.

The Prime Minister intervened and promised that another

census would be held under his supervision.
The results of the second census published on February 25, 1964,
in the Daily Times were as follows:

21

North...................
East............... -.....
West......................
Mid-West..................
Lagos.....................
Total.....................

29,777,986
12,388,646
10,278,500
2,533,337
675,352
55,653,821

The NCNC leaders wasted no time in challenging the exactness of the
figures released by the Census Board.

The students on Ibadan and Ife

Universities joined the NCNC leaders by calling on Nigerians to
reject the figures.

20

The Daily Times wrote:

Daily Times, February 26, 1964, p. 1.

21

Daily Times, 'The Census,

February 25, 1964, p. 1.
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"Why should we inflate our figures?"
"Why can't we fear God and fear figures?"
"We want the correct census f i g u r e s . "22
Dr. Okpara cited the irregularities that were noticed by Eastern
enumerators who were posted to the North:
Counting of Eastern inspectors against the decision
of the boards, double counting, counting of
travellers and passers-by, counting sampled
areas, without an inspector, counting in market
places, counting after November, that is after
the last date of count, refusal to let enumerators
into purdah and late return of enumeration books. J
Once again the crack in the body politics of Nigeria began to
deepen.

The controversy clearly illustrates the regional politics

and the British legacy to Nigeria as Imoudu aptly puts it:

"The

imperialist had helped to create antagonism among leaders that is
the reason why the country is getting headaches about census.
Why should census figures cause headaches?
us clearly in his statements.

24

Imoudu did not tell

But the points of the matter were:

first, the new figures released gave the North a comfortable majority
over the South; second, the federal elections were to be held in 1964
and this was the only opportunity for the Southern politicians to
end Northern domination; finally, since the North has the largest
population it meant that Northern politicians could dominate Nigerian
politics.

^ Daily Times, February 29, 1964, p. 5.
21Nigeria Government and Politics,

p. 553.

^ Daily Times, "Scrap Regions to end the Census," March 14,
1964, p. 11.
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The quarrel over the census almost disintegrated the Federation
of Nigeria.
and the NCNC.

In Lagos, it weakened the coalition government of Balewa,
If there was any fuse that lit other crises it was the

census controversy.

It led to alliances and produced corruption.

It aggravated the splits and distrust in the country.
and East joined in rejecting the new figures.

The Mid-West

The West was in a

dilemma and failed to join her sister states in the South because it
was in a coalition in the Federal government which included Akintola's
new United People's Party (UPP). As for the Premier of the North,
Sarduana of Sokoto, the census figures were accepted as fair and
reasonable because it favored the Northerners.

For Dr. Okpara and

Dennis Osadebay, the Premier of the Mid-West, the battle was lost,
but they took one additional step by filling a suit in the Federal
Supreme Court challenging the census.

The Court dismissed the case

on the ground that the census was a political rather than a legal
issue.

25

The Southern politicians still did not admit defeat or

concede all political power to the North; instead they set to work
in preparing to challenge the Northern hegemony in the general
elections of 1964.
General Election 1964
The election campaign started with the formation of alliances.
The two old parties in the South, the NCNC and AG fused together
to establish the United Progressive Alliance (UPGA).

To oppose this

grouping the NPC and Akintola's new party, NNDP solemnized a marriage
25

Dally Times, "Supreme Court Rejects East Census Motion,"
June 30, 1964, p. 1.
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under a new title of the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA).

Dr.

Okpara was made the leader of UPGA while the leadership in the NNA
fell on Sarduana.
In the North, the two major opposition parties-- the Northern
Element Progressive Union (NEPU) and the United Middle Belt Congress
joined together to form the Northern Progressive Front (NPF), which
was supported by the UPGA.
The two major alliances, NNA and UPGA, were now competing for
power in the Federal election with separate appeals to the electors.
In terms of political issues the NNA emphasized economic development,
eradication of diseases, roads, and education on a national level.
But in the North where it enjoyed a comfortable majority, its
campaign was based on North for Northerners.

The NPC's appeal to

the Northern electorate could be summed up by the big poster in
green and white displayed in every town which read:
The Answer
Which is the best way to vote?
The answer is simple - NPC.
Today you are proud to be a Northerner
NPC fought for you.
We believe in unity with dignity
We talk less and act more
To achieve realities^
This appeal demonstrated that while on the one hand the NPC was
paying lip service to the unity of Nigeria, on the other, it was
preaching tribalism.
In the West the NNDP tried to court the electorate by claiming
that the party stood for unity.
26

It alleged that a vote cast for

Daily Express, "Election Special," December 28, 1964, p. 4.
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UPGA was a sell out of the fate of Yorubas and an invitation for
Ibo domination.
The UPGA on the other hand launched its manifesto which the
party described as "Magna Charter" with pragramatic socialism.

27

The election campaign was filled with abuse, violence, and
tribalism.

The campaign was getting out of hand before election day.

President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe warned Nigeria:

"If this embryo

Republic must disintergrate then in the name of God let the operation
be a hosrt and painless one.

I will enture the prediction that the

experience of Democratic Republic of Congo will be a child's play,
if it comes to our turn to play such a role.

28

The election itself was a tragic mockery.

The president and

Prime Minister disagreed about the necessity for postponing the
election.^

it was alleged that a number of NNA candidates were

returned unopposed because returning officers refused to accept
nominations from their opponents.

The Joint Action Committee (JAC)

tried to call a strike to prevent the electrions, but labor leaders
i
disagreed; the electoral commissioners were divided, but its chairman
Mr. Esus in a nationwide broadcast said the election would take place
while his colleagues were busy discussing possible postponement.
The UPGA boycotted the election.
Lagos.

Polling booths were destroyed in

The NNA had bagged 71 seats out of 320 seats in the Federal

House before the polling day.
27
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On election day there were no elections in the East, and a few
were held in Lagos, but in the North the election continued as
scheduled, which enabled the NNA to secure its majority.
Balewa waited for the President to invite him to form another
government.

It became clear the Azikiwe was strongly opposed to the

election.
For several days it was a trial of strength between the President
and Prime Minister.

Ultimately Azikiwe realized the limitation of

his power under the constitution and his impotence with regards to
the armed forces,

30

so with the help of Justice Mbanefo of Eastern

Region and Chief Justice Ademola he agreed to a compromise.

The

major crisis which had threatened to disintergrate the Federation
had come to an end, and the President invited Balewa to form a new
government.

In a nationwide broadcast, Balewa announced that a

broad based national government was to be formed and elections to be
held in the East.

In these elections the NCNC emerged victorious.

Then Balewa formed his "broad based national government" the
Action Group was excluded.
government.

The NCNC was invited to join the Balewa's

The real loser was the Action Group.

After the 1964 election, the major weakness of the Nigerian
constitution was stated the Odemo of Ishara, he said that the
Nigerian constitution failed to provide for someone whom could say
in time of crisis:

"Come boys enough is enough," that is what you

must do in the interest of the nation."

Because of the absence he

~^Daily Times, "Diary of the Crisis by the State House,"
January 13, 1965, p. 9.
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said, this has made every politician a master in his own house.

31

It was at this crisis that the Nigerians realized that the
President of the Federation was a figure head.

Constitutional experts

asserted that the President's power was minimal and advised him that
if he set up a provisional government or assumed powers of the
parliament or of cabinet, he would be acting contrary to the
constitution.

32

It was shown that the Armed Forces pledged their

oath of office to the Prime Minister and not the President, in spite
of the fact that the President was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces.

When Azikiwe tried to persuade the Commander of the Nigerian

Army, he was told the matter at hand was a political dispute and
withdrew.
The 1964 election was an important political event.

The results

of elections which left Nigeria stalemated revealed the weakness of
the Presidency and it finally led to the demise of parliamentary
democracy.

The crisis pointed out that the President had to act on

the advice of the Prime Minister.
Election in the West (1965)
Every time Nigeria went to the polls the issue focused on the
Southern political parties' challenge of the hegemony of the North.
In 1965, the West became the scene of a power struggle when Akintola's
pro-North government was challenged by the NCNC/AG alliance.,
The Western Region became strategically important to the AG and
NCNC.

If the Grand Alliance won this election, the two popular
31
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Southern political parties-- NCNC/AG would be able to have a commanding
majority in the Senate.

If however, the AG won this election, they

could return to power in the West.
Like the 1964 election, Akintola started with an anti-Ibo
campaign.

The Progressive Alliance sought support of the Western

electorate by pointing out the misfortunes and injustices suffered at
the hands of Akintola's NNDP.

A glaring example of misfortunes and

injustices was the imprisonment of Awolowo.

The UPGA's manifesto

demanded the release of Awolowo from prison.
The election was sought in stages.
nominations.

The first stage was over

The electorial officers accepted the nominations of the

NNDP and made themselves unavailable to the nominations of the
Progressive Alliance.

33

It was even alleged that some key electorial

officers left their posts and ran to the North until nominations were
closed.
The second stage was the voting itself.

The UPGA's polling

agents were prevented from carrying out their duties at the polls,
while the NNDP agents were allowed to carry out their duties.

A

report filed by a TIME correspondent clearly illustrated the
irregularities in this election when he wrote that "In heavy Awolowo
precints, polling places mysteriously ran out of ballots and
Akintola's party stalwarts stuffed the ballot boxes in others."34

^ "N ig e ria :

The Way West was Won," Time, November 19, 1965,

p. 54.
34
Time, p . 54.
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Another observer noted that "Men became pregnant with ballot papers.
The third stage of the battle was fought over counting.

„35

The

strategy here was to prevent agents of the opposition party from
participating in the count.

In certain places where an UPGA candidate

was elected, it was announced over the radio that a defeated NNDP
was elected.

Some candidates reported that under gun point,

Akintola's stalwarts kept them several yards from the counting area.
The fourth stage was a disagreement over the actual members that
were elected.

The people of the West and the Nigerians were besieged

with conflicting election results.

While the Western Region radio

was announcing Akintola's cabinet, the Eastern Region radio was
announcing that Adegbenro's victory was 78 to 18.

36

The Western news

media declared Akintola elected while the Eastern news media
announced that Adegbenro was the new premier.

Adegbenro at a.

conference on the evening after election named his cabinet which the
Governor refused to accept.

The West was thrown into political

confusion because there were two premiers claiming the office.
last, the Governor accepted Akintola instead of Adegbenro.

At

The

following day Adegbenro was arrested for unlawfully forming a
government without the consent of the regional governor.

He was asked

to recant his speech in which he made in the Western Region as regards
forming a government.

Adegbenro at the police station called a press

conference to deny that he had formed a government.

^ Time. p. 54.
36„.
c/
Time, p. 54.
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Nigeria was once again on the verge of destruction by those who
founded it.
with UPGA.
election.

There were protests all over the country in sympathy
The Westerners were frustrated at the results of the
Another crisis set in.

A Nigerian playwright, Wole

Soyinka stormed into the government owned station at Ibadan with
guns in his hand, and demanded that a new election be called.
erupted in the West.

Riots

Market women known to be UPGA supporters deserted

their stalls and took to the streets in protest against Akintola.
Towns were burned down to the ground and NNA supporters were set
ablaze.

At Abeokuta, supporters of UPGA drove nails into a pro-NNA

judge and his clerk.

o7

In January, 1966, while delegates were arriving at Lagos for a
Commonwealth Conference to discuss the question of restoring Ian
Smith's regime, a few miles from Lagos airport, scores of Nigerians
O O

were hacked to death.

Supporters of the AG set up road blocks on a

key highway leading into Lagos, and held motorists at gun point.
A number of travellers were robbed or murdered.

The charred body

of one victim was seen propped against a sign post.

39

It was evident

from the wave of thuggery and breakdown of law and order that Nigeria
was on its political deathbed.
Once again the political system of Nigeria had been stretched.
When a system had been stretched to its breaking point and made to
37

Time, p. 54.

~^Time, p. 54.
39"'Nigerian Tragedy," Time, January 24, 1966, p. 40.
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snap back, politicians start to ask questions.
in this episode was:

The thorny question

Why did Balewa fail to declare a state of

emergency in the West?

Since Balewa had declared a state of

emergency in 1962 over an uproar in the Western House of Assembly,
one might have expected him to do the same thing in this situation.
The evidence of naked rigging of the election by the NNDP should have
been enough reason.
no power.

Balewa's answer to his critics was that he had

The fact was, Akintola was the premier and pro-North

whereas, in 1962 Adegbenro was supposed to be the premier and antiNorth.

Furthermore, Balewa was not prepared to reprimand his

Southern ally.

CHAPTER

5

The Politics of Military Government
When Nigeria obtained its independence, the hope was that an
expanding economy would help to propel Nigerian political leaders
from a communal to a national orientation.

In the sixties Nigerian

GNP moved steadily upward, but the political atmosphere of the
country did not improve.

For instance, between 1958 and 1966,

there was an increase of the total exports.

Government oil revenues

from rents, royalties, premium, profit taxes and custom duties soared
from $14 million in 1963 to $76 million in 1967.^

Despite the

economic growth, the political elites in the regions and federal
government were interested in manipulating the masses, lining their
pockets with public funds instead of improving the welfare of the
people . 2
*
There were many factors which contributed to the breakdown of
the Nigerian political system.

The disillusionment started with the

rigging of the census figures.

Corruption featured all levels of the

government.

National politics became a bargaining process between

the conservative North and the progressive South with the minority
groups left out.

Every year Nigeria stumbled from one crisis to the

other.

^Sayre P. Schatz, "A Look at the Balance Sheet," Africa Report,
15 (January 1970): 18.
2 Ibid.

r-O
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In 1962, the crisis in the West resulted in a split within the
Action Group.

This divided the Yorubas into warring factions.

It

also brought Akintola power, who ruthlessly silenced opposition,
to his power.

A nationwide strike in 1964, which was called by the

trade union, almost crippled the economy of the country.

In the

same year, the campaigns and elections brought friction between the
North and South, while the post-election truce barely saved the
federation from disintegration.

Finally, there was the rigging of

elections in the West, followed by a wave of thuggery by party
stalwarts.
There were strong pressures on Balewa to declare a state of
public emergency in the West.

Time was too short for Balewa.

situation had exploded from a blaze into holocaust.

The

On January 15,

1966, the government of Sir Abubakar was toppled by a military coup
which marked the closing chapter of the first Republic.
Background Story of The Coup
The military coup which toppled Balewa's government was stagemanaged by junior army officers who were frustrated with the
corruption and incompetence of the regional and federal ministers.
The coup was carried out in three phases.
Kaduna.

Phase one was in

The group leader was Major Nzeogwu, an Ibo from the Mid-West.

On early morning of January 15, he led a small detachment of soldiers,
mostly Hausa, on the pretext that they were on routine, military
exercises.

When they arrived at the Sarduana's residence, Nzeogwu

told them that they had come to kill him.
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The soliders stormed Sarduana's fortified castle.

The guards

opened fire on the soldiers before they were overpowered by Nzeogwu
and his men.
mortars.

Once inside the compound, they shelled the palace with

Nzeogwu chased the premier from one room to the other.

Sir Ahmadu was caught and immediately shot.
Elsewhere in Kaduna, Nzeogwu's men entered into the residence
of Brigadier Sam Ademolegun, a Yoruba, and shot him and his wife in
their bed.

'The Kaduna phase ended with the killing of Colonel

Sodiende, a Yoruba.
The second phase was in Lagos.
Ammanuel Ifejuana, an Ibo.
out the corp.

The coup was led by Major

He and his men drove to Lagos to carry

Three senior officers of Northern origin were gunned

down because they resisted arrest.

While Ifejuana's soldiers were

seeking out the top army officers, Ifejuana headed for the politicians.
He arrested the Prime Minister, Sir Akubakar Tafawa Balewa, and Chief
Festus Okotie-Eboh, bundled them in a car, and drove away.

A few

days later their bodies were discovered in a shallow grave on a
main Abeokuta road.

Before dawn the revoluntionaries had seized

strategic places in the Federal capital.

The Lagos episode was

completed, with the killing of an Ibo officer, Major Arthur Unegbu,
who refused to hand over the key to the armory at Ikeja barracks.
Ibadand was the final phase of the coup.
revolutionaries was Akintola.

The target of the

When the residence of Akintola was

stormed by a group of soldiers, he defended himself with an automatic
rifle, killing a small number of soldiers.

When he was captured, his
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body was so riddled with bullets that it was beyond recognition.
In enugu and Benin there was no action.
surrounded the Premier's lodges.

Soldiers merely

As far as the coup was concerned

it was a failure, because the plotters did not leave their mean in
those cities in which the coup took place.

At Kaduna where Nzeogwu

was in command, he set up a provisional government.

In a broadcast

to the people of the North, he said:
In the name of the Supreme Council of the
Revolution of the Armed Forces, I declara
martial law over the Northern Provinces of
Nigeria. The Constitution is suspended and
the legal government and elected Assembly
hereby dissolved.^
The coup had gone well in the North according to plan.
Nzeogwu emerged as the head of the military government in the North.
This was short lived.

In Lagos, the coup was foiled by the Major-

General Aguiyi-Ironsi, and Ibo and Commander of the Nigerian Armed
Forces.

He too was destined to die during the coup.

General Ironsi

moved quickly to neutralize his junior officers and took control.
When Nzeogwu realized that the coup had been foiled he took a
column of troops to march on Lagos.
River Niger.

They reached Jebba on the

Had they crossed, nothing could have saved Nigeria

from a civil war.

4

The first indication of military takeover was an announcement at
midday of January 15, 1966.

The statement alleged that the 'vast

majority of the army, loyal to General Ironsi, was bringing the
3
The Biafra Story, p. 38.
Walter Schwarz, Nigeria, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger
Publishers, 1968\ p. 198.
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situation under control'. ^
head

For several days Nigeria was left without a

of state.
The rump of the cabinet met under the chairmanship of Alhaji

Dipcharima to appoint a Deputy Prime Minister who would give orders
to the army.

The cabinet was divided on who should be appointed.

The NPC wanted a Northerner to replace Balewa, but Dr. Orizu who
was acting as the President of the Republic wanted Dr. Mbadiwe, an
Ibo, to be appointed.

5

When another meeting of the Council of

Ministers met, Ironsi explained that he could not ensure the loyalty
of his officers unless the government was handed over to him.

The

cabinet had no choice but to concede to Ironsi.
The first problem of the new government was dealing with Major
Nzeokwu who had already set up a revolutionary government in the
North.

The Major promised to surrender to the Supreme Commander

on condition that a safe conduct be given to him and all those
concerned with the death of the Sarduana of Sokoto and a guarantee
of immunity from trial.^

The Supreme Commander accepted those terms

but when Nzeogwu surrendered himself in Lagos he was arrested and
detained with other coup leaders.

Ironsi now emerged as the head of

the Federal Military Government with those who staged the coup in
prison.

The new head of state appointed a military government in

each region.

The military governors were to be directly responsible

to the Federal Military Government.

5 Ibid.

^Sir Rex Niven, Nigeria, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Publishers, 1967), p. 117.
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The new military regime started well.

A foreign correspondent

for the ECONOMIST who visited Sokoto reported on the popularity of
the new regime and how it was received:
Sokoto was the spoiled darling of the Sarduana
of Sokoto's regime; yet even here its passing
was accepted quietly. If there are misgivings
about what happened, the death of the Sarduana
has left nobody to express them.7
Irons! found himself in a position of power not of his own
making but Nigerians were ready to give him a try.

The first

political mistake of Ironsi was, the appointment of Sir Francis
Nwokedi, an Ibo civil servant, as the sole commissioner to inquire
g

into the unification of the public services.

This was a blow to

the North, where regional administration was prized as the main
safeguard against domination of the South.

The North protested that

such an important issue should not be entrusted to one man and
especially Ibo.

After much protest, a Mid-Westerner was added to

the commission.

With this the North was satisfied.

When Ironsi assumed power, he had promised that before a
return to civilian government, he would conduct a series of studies
to look into Nigeria's basic problems.

In keeping with his promise,

he appointed Chief Rotimi Williams, and Dr. T. 0. Elias, the
9

Attorney-General to draw up outlines for a new Constitution.

^"Ironsi Starts Well," The Economist, February 1966, p. 592.
^The Biafra Story, p . 45.
g

"Datelines Africa," West Africa, April 22, 1966,

p. 391.

65

A commission of economic planning was established, and its function
was entrusted to Chief Adebo, and Dr. Pius Okigbo.

When the

Commissions reported their findings, all pointed in the same
direction-- unification.^
Unification had been publicly discussed from the beginning of
Ironsi's military regime.

At the end of January 1966, Colonel Ejoor

of the Mid-West called for a "unitary form of government."
Ironsi in support of unification said:
It has become apparent to all Nigerians that
rigid adherence to regionalism was the bane of
the last regime and one of main factors which
contributed to its downfall. No doubt the
country would welcome a clean break with these
deficiencies.^
The Supreme Commander was overly optimistic when he uttered
those words.

He forgot that the North was different from the

progressive South.

What Ironsi did not realize was that the Emirs

and the Northern Representatives used regionalism to maintain their
dominance against educated Southerners.

To abolish regions would

amount to stripping the North of that power base which gave them
dominance over the political system of Nigeria.
In the South, unification was popular among the Ibos. They
are settled in different parts of Nigeria.

To the Ibos, regionalism

had always meant treatment as second class citizens in their own
country.

It was also an opportunity for them to get jobs in other

regions.

10

The Biafra Story, p. 45.

^ West Africa, April 22, 1966, p. 391.
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Discontent arose in the North as various commissions were
inquiring about aspects of unification.

The popularity of the

military regime in the North started to fall from "grace to
grass."

A point that must be understood is that when politicians

fall, it is not just a handful of people, but their fall involves
thousands who lose their meal tickets.

A large number of families

after the death of the Sarduana of Sokoto found themselves without
support.

As a result, many found themselves on that breadline.

The Sarduana who was regarded as an unscrupulous father after the
first coup was now seen as a benefolent father.

To aggravate the

situation, life was not at all better for the common man.
Disillusionment set in.
Nigeria is a country of rumor and myth.

It was rumored that

the majors who organized the January military coup received their
monthly wages while they were imprisoned.

Northerners now lamented

the death of the four army officers who were assassinated in the
January coup.

They demanded that those whose hands were stained

with the blood of the Northern army officers should be brought to
trial.
While the North was lamenting the killing of the four Northern
army officers, it was caught with the announcement of Ironsi that
Nigeria would cease to be a federation and that a unitary system
with strong centralized government would be introduced.

12

Ironsi's speech ignited the latent crisis hallowing in the
12"Nigeria End of a Tragedy," Bulletin of the Africa Institute
and South Africa, 8 (April 1970): 93.

North.

All old fears came to the surface.

demonstration at Kano.

It began with a student

Within hours, it turned into bloodbath.

Hundreds of things in Kano stormed Sabon Gari (stranger's quarters)
where the Ibos lived, raping, burning, looting and killing men,
women and children of Eastern origin.
to other cities.

The killing quickly spread

To the Hausa, the day to revenge the assassination

of those Northerners who were killed in January had come.
The Northern governor, Colonel Katsina, tried to bring things
under control by summoning all the Northern Emirs for an emergency
meeting in order to curb the madness in the region.

After the

meeting, the Emirs issued a communique that Ironsi should abrogate
the Unification Degree or they would secede.

13

General Ironsi

explained that the degree involved no changes of boundary and that
indeed it hardly changed the status quo at all.

He pointed out that

its purposes was to allow the military government to carry on the
administration effectively.^

The Emirs were satisfied with

Ironsi's explanations.
The question which confronted Colonel Ojukwu was:

What should

be done to those Ibo who fled from the North after the massacres?
Ojukwu urged and assured them to return to their homes in the
North and that the Ibos should accept the May killings as "part of
the price

they have to pay for the ideal of One Nigeria," a

statement which he was to regret.

^ The Biafra Story, p. 58.

It was clear to all that the January coup had solved nothing.
It merely ousted corrupt politicians and even some honest ones.
It became evident that Nigeria was expecting another coup.
question was:

From where would the next coup come?

South champion another coup?

The

Or, would the

In July, the questions were answered.

The Counter Coup^~*
The July coup started at the Abeokuta barracks when a Hausa
captain with a group of troops entered the officer's mess and shot
Eastern officers.

They stormed the barracks, disarmed the Southern

soldiers on guard, and seized the armory and armed soliders of
Northern origin.
Ironsi, who had just completed his nation-wide tour, was at
Ibadan as a guest of Lieutenant Fajuyi, was kidnapped at the
Government Lodge by the Northern soliders, taken to an unknown
destination, and executed.

Once again, the army, which had been

the most consistent and desciplined insitution in Nigeria was torn
by ethnic factions and rigid adherence to regionalism.
The revolt spread quickly to the Ikeja barracks, and rebels
took control of Ikeja Airport.

Easterners were killed in several

barracks; this made it clear that it was a Hausa coup.

Ogundipe,

who was next in line to Ironsi, was urged by Ojukwu to take up
position of the Supreme Commander, but the junior officers refused
to obey.

Gowon was then asked to negotiate with the rebels.

three days of choas, Nigeria was left without a head of state.

1S

After
Once

Based on Sir Rex Niven's, Nigeria, Chapter 12, pp. 114-117.
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again there was talk of succession from the North.

At last,

Gowon emerged as the new Supreme Commander.
Gowon, having planted himself in a position of power with a
military government, facedthree unresolved problems:

the killing

inside the army must be stopped; a Supreme Commander that would be
acceptable to all had to be found; and an acceptable basis of
association had to be sought.

16

On the first point, there was little progress made.

Gowon

posted the soldiers to barracks within their region of origin.
There was a flaw in this solution because there were very few Yorubas
in the army to replace Northern troops stationed in the West.

They

stayed put in the West and acted like an army of occupation.
The other issues (i.e. an acceptable Supreme Commander and
acceptable basis of association) led to disintegration of the
Federation and to civil war.

Meanwhile, in each region discussions were

going on as to what type of association should be agreed upon.

The

East was in favor of a loose association in which a large measure of
Authority would be given to the Regions.^

The West and Mid-West

favored the creation of more states in which the minority would
be given consideration, but the North, which held political power,
opposed the creation of more states.

18

In order to search for unity in Nigeria, an Ad Hoc Constitutional

^ Nigeria , p. 212.
^ Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, 8 (April
1970):94.
18

Ibid.
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Review Conference which consisted on "leaders of thought" met in
Lagos to discuss what arrangements would be acceptable to the
Nigerian people.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Four alternative arrangements were submitted:

A federal system with a strong center
A federal system with a weak center
A confederation
A new arrangement peculiar to Nigeria which has
not found its way into any dictionary.-*-^

As the conference was in session, a second massacre of the Eastern
ers began in the North.
letting.

This time it was ferocious and blood

Leaving the story to independent observers to tell,

here are some accounts from the Time and Newsweek:
The massacre began at the airport near the 5th
Battalion's home city of Kano. A Lagos-bound
jet had just arrived from London, and as the Kano
passengers were escorted into the customs shed,
a wild-eyed soldier stormed in, brandishing a rifle
and demanding "INA NYAMMARI?"--Hausa for "Where are
the damned Ibos?". There were Ibos among the custom
officials, and they dropped their chalk and fled,
only to be shot down in the main terminal by other
soldiers. Screaming the blood curses of a Moslem
holy war, the Hausa troops turned the airport into
a shambles, bayoneting Ibo workers in the bar,
gunning them down in the corridors, and hauling
Ibo passengers off the plane to be lined up and
shot.
From the airport the troops fanned out through down
town Kano, hunting down Ibos in bars, hotels, and on
the streets. One contigent drove their Landrovers to
the railroad station where more than 100 Ibos were
waiting for a train, and cut them with automatic
weapon fire.

19
Ntieyong U. Akpan, The Struggle for Seccession, 1966-1970,
(London: Frank Cass, 1972), p. 46.
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The soldiers did not have to do all the killing.
They were soon joined by thousands of Hausa
civilians, who rampaged through the city armed
with stones, cutlasses, matchets and home-made
weapons of metal and broken glass... ransacking,
looting and burning Ibo homes and stores and
murdering their owners.
The "Newsweek" correspondent on October 17, filed
the following reports.
...angry Hausa tribemen invaded homes and offices
where Ibos were likely to be found. With guns
and matchets, bottles and iron rods, the Northerners
beat or murdered any Ibo (or suspected Ibo) who
fell into their hands. Hundreds of Ibos were killed
and hundreds more fled in panic to airports and
railroad stations, trying to get abroad planes and
trains pressed into evacuation service. 1
The October massacre cannot be attributed to any one factor.
The organizers of the massacre stage-managed it in order to drive
the Ibos out of the North.

Some of the Ibo characteristics were

also responsible for the outbreak of the killings.

The Ibos were

often clannish, arrogant, avaricious and practiced favoritism in
getting jobs.

In the days of Ironsi, it was alleged that the

Ibos displayed provocative pictures of the Sarduana of Sokoto.
The massacre was a blow to any further attempt to hold the
federation together.
posts for the East.

An immense number of the Ibos left their
Ojukwu, faced with the task of feeding the

refugees from the north, ordered all members of non-Eastern origin
to leave the region immediately, announcing in these words:

^"Nigeria:
pp. 46-47.
21

p. 54.

"Africa:

Massacre in Kano," Time, October 17, 1966,

Drama in Two Acts," Newsweek, October 1 7 , 1 9 6 6 ,
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" 1 have lost confidence in my ability to continue restraining the

violently injured feelings of the people of this region."
radio broadcast Ojukwu told his people:

22

In a

"I have said before that

the East would not secede unless she is forced out."

23

The Military Governor of the East refused to attend any further
conference in Lagos until his personal safety was guaranteed.

Once

again the cry for secession became louder from the East.
The situation became worse as Ojukwu refused to accept the
leadership of General Gowon.

An open arms race developed between

the East and the Federal government.

In order to avoid what looked

like the falling apart of the Federation, General Ankrah, head of
the Ghana's miliary government, persuaded Nigerian leaders to meet
at Aburi in January 1967 to settle their differences.

Ojukwu met

the Nigerian military rulers at Aburi, Ghana, but no agreement was
reached on the constitutional question as to the future framework
of Nigeria.

24

The relationship between Lagos and the Eastern Region

began to deteriorate.

Ojukwu refused to send federal revenues

collected in his region to Lagos.

In retaliation, Gowon declared

a postal blockade against the East.
In the East it seemed clear the path toward sucession had
gained an upper hand.
for Ojukwu to shoulder.

The clamer to get out of Nigeria was too much
On toy 26, 1967, when Ojukwu met his

22 '
Time, October 14, 1966, p. 47.
2 3 Ibid, p. 47.
9/

^Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, April 1970,
p. 94.
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consultative assembly, they urged him to declare the Eastern Region
a sovereign state.

The same evening Gowon announced a decree

dividing Nigeria into twelve states.
Birth of Biafra
On May 30, in reaction to Gowon's announcement three days earlier
of the decree to divide Nigeria into twelve states, Ojukwu announced
from the East that the former Eastern Region has seceded from the
Federation of Nigeria and would be known as the Republic of Biafra.

25

With these words, former Eastern Nigeria became an independent state
and the word Biafra found its way into the contemporary political
dictionary.

It was clear that war would be necessary in order to bring

the former Eastern Region back to Nigeria.
Nigeria - Biafra War
This is not the place to narrate a military history of the war.
The first shots were fired on July 6 , 1967, when the federal troops
advanced into Biafra on two fronts.
The war lasted two and one-half years.

During this time, the

Federal troops pressed Biafra territory into a shrinking enclave, so
that by the beginning of 1970, Biafra was entirely landlocked and all
supplies had to be brought in through Uli Airport.
The starvation of the Ibos arose the consciousness of the world.
The public opinion of the world became incensed by the photographs
which were widely distributed by Biafran public relations office in
Geneva.

This precipitated the international Red Cross and the Caritas

2 ^Ibid., p. 95.

International to organize massive food distribution in Biafra.
Out of sympathy, the French government started to supply Biafra with
substantial quantities of arms through Gabon.
Apprehension of African Countries
African countries became upset as the foreign countries outside
Africa engaged in gunrunning in the Nigeria-Biafra conflict.
hate the word secession.

They

The word stung because independent African

countries are aware of the fact that the existing boundries of all
African states are artificially drawn without regard for the native.
The fear that haunts African states is, once an ethnic group has
demonstrated a possibility of successful secession, the epidemic
could spread to other African countries.

Because of this belief,

the Organization of African Unity (OAU) regularly preaches unity
and is always careful in taking sides.

The OAU tried to mediate

between Gowon and Ojulcwu but was unable to take sides.
The Ibos gained some international recognition for Biafra.
Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast and Gabon recognized Biafra.

27

The

African countries that recognized Biafra might have done it in order
to reduce Nigeria's great size and potential power.

28

The Collapse of Biafra
Ojukwu made a last attempt to convince the world that he was
26

Russell Warren Howe, "Nigeria at War," Editorial Research
Report, 1 (February 1968):157.
27

Bulletin of the African Institute and South Africa, April,
1970, p. 97.
28

Editorial Research Reports, 1968, p. 158.
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prepared to talk before his regime collapsed, but the federal
government was not prepared to talk.
delegates to Addis Ababa.

The Biafran leader sent

Before the delegation left, Ojukwu

insisted that the talks were to be held under the chairmanship of
ft
His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia in his capacity as
the head of his country and not as the chairman of the OAU
consultative committee.

29

The reason for this was to escape from

the unification policy which was unacceptable to Biafra.
trick did not work.

The

For one thing, Ojukwu's mandate to his

delegation that the Emperor should act as the head of his country
and not as the chairman of the OAU resulted in the federal
delegation not leaving Lagos.
The time was too short for Ojukwu to pull another political
trick.

The federal troops were making progress on every front.

Owerri was captured, the last seat of Ojukwu's government and Uli
airfield came within the shelling range.

On January 1970, the world

was alarmed to hear that Ojukwu had fled Biafra for the Ivory Coast.
He told the exhausted Biafrans that he was leaving "in search of
peace."

The leadership of Biafra was entrusted to Major-General

Philip Effiong who surrendered to the federal troops.
After thirty months of bloody war the Ibos lost their struggle
for an independent Biafra.

To many people, especially foreign

observers, the collapse of Biafra came not as a surprise but as a

29

Bulletin of the African Institute of South Africa. April

1 9 7 0 , p. 1 0 1 .
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tragedy.

To some people the basic issue was the Catholics

against the Northern Muslims.

To others, Biafra had fought

gallantly for her self-determination.

CONCLUSION
Nigeria can be compared to a man suffering from cancer; in
an attempt to find a panacea to his illness, that country went
through crisis after crisis.

In 1962 the first major crisis broke

out in the Western Region which placed the region under federal
emergency rule.

A second major crisis occurred over the 1964

federal election which almost disintegrated the Federation of
Nigeria.

A more serious challenge to the federation came in 1965

when the NNA rigged the Western election which ultimately led to a
breakdown of law and order in the west and the inability of the
Prime Minister to declare a state of emergency in that region.
Subsequently a military coup was staged by a group of young
officers in January 1966 which resulted in a number of prominent
politicians being killed and then a counter coup which erupted into
a civil war.
While the crises occurred in the 1960's, the roots of these
crises actually originated with the British decision on
amalgamation of 1914.

If the British had possessed fore-thought

and imagination, it could have been averted but when Whitehall
accepted Lugard's amalgamation it inevitably resulted in the
ossification of regional separation.

What this study maintains is

that while Nigerian politicians share part of the responsibility,
the major part of the responsibility should be shouldered by the
77

British government.
The reasons are:

When the British authority passed to Nigerians

it would have been better to have created more states which would
have made it impossible for one ethnic group to threaten the
existence of the federation.

It would have been wiser if the British

government had conducted a fresh census to determine the actual
population of Nigeria.

But the British turned around and departed

from Nigeria'with the basic problems unsolved; consequently when the
Nigerian politicians took over they became political jugglers who
had to keep the balls constantly in balance.

As a result, it was

too late for Nigerians to meet the challenge of choosing either
separate nations or creation of more states.
An examination of the Nigerian constitution revealed that from
1951-1960, the British imposed three constitutions on Nigeria.

The

Macpherson Constitution brought regionalism and the Independence
Constitution solidified it and entrenched the Westminister model.
It may be questioned whether it was wise to introduce the West
minister model when the conditions in Nigeria were quite different
from Britain.

Merely to set up a Westminister model in Nigeria

showed lack of foresight on the part of the British officials.
Furthermore, a critical examination of Nigerian experience from
1914 and after independence revealed that the debit balance of the
imperial system by far outweighed its credits accounts.

In terms of

Nigeria's internal division this thesis supported the facts that a
federal constitution consisting of three regions was an arbitrary
decision of the colonial power.

The word arbitrary is taken to mean
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that the present Nigeria did not exist; at the beginning of the
20th century it consisted of a greater number of states with no
affinity which were integrated by the forces of imperialists into a
new artificial political unit.

Therefore, Nigeria can be said to be

an arbitrary British creation.

To the outside world Nigeria is a

country, but to Nigerians it is an artificiality because the British
did not give Nigerians a sense of nationhood when they departed.
The Nigerians continued to think in terms of regions.
One should not forget that the British maintained a policy of
divide and rule in Nigeria.

For example, after the amalgamation

the North was not made to integrate with the South.

It would have

been better if the North had been made to mix with the South.

So,

when independence came, it was too late for the North to integrate
because the British had ossified regionalism.
It is interesting to point out in the Conclusion that the
Federation of Nigeria is a peculiar one.

Only after understanding

this can one cast the major blame on the British.

The British

government deviated from the essential ingredients of federalism
which, as John Stuart Mill pointed out, are:
That there should not be any one State so much
more powerful than the rest as to be capable
of vying in strength with many of them combined.
If there is such one, and only one, it will insist
on being master of the joint deliberations: if
there be two, they will be irrestible when they
agree; and whenever they differ everything will
be decided by a struggle for ascendency between
the rivals. ®

Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government, London, Oxford University
Press, 1953, p. 52. See also "Representative Government," Everyman
ed. p. 367-368,
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In the Nigerian federal structure one region is greater than
the Southern regions combined; as a result, the larger region was
able to use its power to twist the arms of the federation.

Because

of this imbalance, national politics became a bargaining process
between the conservative north and the progressive south.

Further

more, the British assigned enormous powers to the chiefs by creating
the Houses of Chiefs.

They then possessed powers they never had

before when the colonial masters ruled Nigeria.

This entrenched

tribalism because of the chiefs over-allegiance to the Emirs and
Obas, unlike Britain where the Lords owe no political allegiance
to the Queen, and perhaps, most significantly the Queen is not a
tribal head.
As noted above, the British created the Nigerian crisis when
two Nigerias were amalgamated.

It was not they who bore the brunt

but the embattled people of Nigeria.

The mistake of 1914 over the

British policy in Nigeria precipitated the tragedies that beset
Nigeria after independence.
The cultural division of the country should have made the
British consider the creation of two countries, but they did not.
Instead they adopted Lugard's recommendation for the unification of
two Nigerias, an error which caused difficulties for the people of
Nigeria for years to come.

It was the mistake of 1914 of the British

amalgamation of Nigeria which precipitated the tragedies that beset
Nigeria after independence.
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